


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REPORT

OF

THE SECRETARY OF WAR,

COMMUNICATING,

In compliance with a resolution of the Senate, Colonel McCall's reports in relation to New Mexico.

FEBRUARY 10, 1851.

Referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

FEBRUARY 11, 1851.

Ordered to be printed.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 10, 1851.

SIR: In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 6th instant, I have the honor herewith to transmit copies of Colonel McCall's report, made to this department from Santa Fé, under date of the 15th July, 1850, and also of his report made to the Adjutant General, on the 26th December, 1850.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

C. M. CONRAD,
Secretary of War.

HON. WM. R. KING,
President of the Senate.

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO,
July 15, 1850.

SIR: Since my arrival in New Mexico, having kept in view the instructions with which I was honored, contained in your letter of November 19, 1849, to wit: "It will be instructive (and probably necessary information, when the people of New Mexico form a constitution and seek admission into the confederacy of the States,) to have your observations and views on their probable numbers, habits, customs, and pursuits of life;" and the people of New Mexico having formed and adopted a State constitution, and transmitted it to the Executive, to be laid before the Congress of the United States; I have now to submit, in compliance with your instructions, a few remarks, the result of much inquiry, and of such personal observation as could be made while in the regular discharge of military duties.

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First. The population of New Mexico is, I am satisfied, less than has been represented.

According to the statistics presented by Governor Martinez, at the division of the Department of New Mexico into districts, in the year 1844, the population, including the Pueblos or civilized Indians, amounted to one hundred thousand.

If at the period alluded to the number of inhabitants was not overrated, which is more than probable, it has certainly since then diminished in a most unaccountable manner. I have taken pains to ascertain the number of Mexicans, residents of this Department, who at the time of its cession to the United States declared their adhesion to the republic of Mexico; and of these, how many afterwards withdrew their declaration and remained here, and how many actually left our territory; and of the latter, how many have since returned to make it their permanent home; and I am satisfied that the loss in numbers does not exceed one thousand, or, at the most, twelve hundred souls. In addition to those above mentioned, a few men of wealth, with their peons, have within the past year removed to *Guadalupe*, a settlement on the right bank of the Rio Grande, twenty-five miles below El Paso del Norte, where inducements have been held out by the Mexican government to bring over to their side the rich and better class of people. The numerical loss thus sustained is scarcely appreciable. In fact, there is no known cause that could have materially reduced the population of New Mexico within the last six years; yet, from positive data, it is very clear that it does not now amount to the number above stated.

Where but little is known, and where, in seeking that little, conflicting statements are frequently encountered, it is no easy matter to arrive at the truth; therefore, I will not venture the assertion that the population of New Mexico, at the present time, greatly exceeds the quota required to give one seat in the House of Representatives of the United States; and, indeed, so great a portion of the face of the country is made up of rugged mountains and waste plains, that it cannot be expected soon, if ever, to receive and support a population in numbers and wealth at all proportioned to its extent of territory.

Besides the native Mexicans, the present population includes, of persons born in the United States and in Europe, who have become citizens of the State, at the extent twelve hundred. And of the natives, besides those whom strictly speaking we call Mexicans, there is another distinct and numerous class which seems to invite particular attention. I mean the Pueblo Indians.

Having embraced Christianity under the Spanish rule, the Pueblos were admitted to the rights of citizenship by the Mexican government under Iturbide; and these rights, which they have enjoyed to the present time, (at least in name) are confirmed to them by the State constitution. Under this they are subject to taxation (by legislation) in common with other inhabitants. It is to be hoped, however, the legislature will, in its wisdom, adopt a mild and conciliatory policy towards these people. Under the present change of government the impressions first made it will be difficult to remove from their minds; and dissatisfaction produced at the outset, may ultimately lead to more serious results than would at first glance appear. To explain this, it will be necessary to state in what way the Pueblos may be made an element of much good or evil to the State.

These Indians still carry on an occasional traffic, and are careful to maintain a good understanding with the wild Indians. Not only, then, may their influence be used to advantage in controlling, and, indeed, in reclaiming, several of the least savage of these tribes; but if at any time the United States find it necessary to chastise an open declaration of hostilities by several of the border tribes—a thing not impossible when a decided effort to restrain their predatory habits comes to be made—they will find valuable auxiliaries in the Pueblos, who count at least twenty-five hundred warriors. On the other hand, should the latter from any cause become dissatisfied, either from what they might conceive to be the oppressive bearing of a law of the State, or its maladministration by the petty authorities, (for they still look upon the Mexicans with distrust,) it would be easy for their parties at different points to unite with the enemy for marauds or for battle without fear of detection.

They have twenty towns or settlements, which contain at least two thousand four hundred families. These, at the moderate computation of four to each family, gives a total of nine thousand six hundred souls; but they probably exceed ten thousand. Each town is a distinct community, having its *gubernador*, or chief, and council; and each community (as a corporation) owns the soil it cultivates. This, a grant from the Spanish crown, is embraced within a circle whose radius is a league—the town its centre. The Pueblos are intelligent, moral, sober, and industrious; and, generally speaking, they are better off than the lower class of Mexicans. Many of them in each town speak the Spanish intelligibly, and some of the principal men read and even write the language as far as is required in their simple business transactions.

The “habits and customs” of the Mexican portion of the inhabitants do not differ materially from those of Mexicans elsewhere; yet, in some particulars, changes, the effect of intercourse with our people, have already begun to show themselves. An impression has been made, and perhaps the first step towards better things has already been accomplished. Here in Santa Fe the diminution of filth in the streets, and the improved dress and personal cleanliness of the people, together with the cloaking of immorality, show that precept and example are not altogether thrown away upon them.

The number who are of Spanish blood, unmixed, is small: in the mass that of the Indian predominates—so in the mass the character and disposition of the latter are to a greater or less degree inherited. This is evinced in more than one trait; but it is sufficient to cite their extreme aversion to continued labor. If a Mexican has not inextricably involved himself as the debtor of his employer, and, through the action of the law (Mexican) against debtors, become a peon for life, it is with difficulty he can be kept at work longer than is requisite to earn a few dollars; and while this lasts, he indulges to the full the luxury of lounging away the hours of the day with his *cigarito*, and perhaps the evening in the more exciting amusements of the fandango and the monte table; nor does he resume his task until compelled by want. Being moderate in his appetites, he requires but little to subsist on, and therefore is constrained to labor but little.

The lower class are as ignorant as idle; and even among their superiors education is woefully neglected. From this it may be inferred that no great improvement in the moral condition of the present generation can

be expected from the introduction of our institutions, which they can neither understand nor appreciate. It is to the coming generation we must look for this; and therefore the introduction of primary schools at as early a day as practicable is a consideration of much interest.

Of their "pursuits of life," their manufactures, perhaps, stand lowest on the scale: they are certainly primitive in their character. Yet this is not so much to be attributed to a deficiency of aptness and manual skill or dexterity as to the want of proper instruction and better models, with more continued and systematic application. Gradual improvement in this branch may, therefore, be looked for, if their natural indolence can be overcome, or their love of gain be stimulated through the influence of our own enterprising countrymen. The establishment of manufactories would do much to accomplish both, and, by fixing the price of labor at a fair rate, would probably prove to be the greatest lever that could be used in overturning the present system of *peonage*.

The cheapness of wool (which in time will be improved in quality as well as reduced in price) will *at once* lead to the erection of factories for making carpets, blankets, and the coarser cloths; and they will not only supply the wants of the State itself, but to some extent the adjoining departments of Mexico. These fabrics will likewise eventually become important articles of traffic with the large tribes of mountain and prairie Indians. The coarse woollens, if, with the exception of the head workmen, Mexican operatives can be used, may be afforded here at prices to preclude competition; for, independently of the cost of transportation, the price of wool and the price of labor are here from one third to one-half less than in the United States.

To a moderate extent *iron works* may also be profitably established. Iron is abundant, and of fair quality, as is the coal, which is more or less bituminous, and will answer to reduce the ore. The heavy cost of transportation from the United States will, it is probable, soon call attention to this subject.

At present but little attention is paid to *mining*, for two reasons—a want of capital, if not a want of enterprise, among the people, and an inherent fear of "*los Indios*." There is, however, reason to believe that the mines may hereafter become the principal source of wealth to the State. The mines of New Mexico have always been represented as rich in gold, and immensely productive to the Spaniards until repeated incursions of hostile Indians caused them to be abandoned. The localities of these mines are at this time for the greater part unknown—the wild tribes who inhabit the supposed gold regions having prevented their exploration. And for the same reason, under present circumstances, their exploration is beyond the reach of private enterprise. Nothing, therefore, can be satisfactorily known of the richness or poverty of the State in this respect until its vast mountain regions are thoroughly and scientifically explored. With this view, it would be well if a topographical engineer were associated with an able, practical geologist, in order that the government might receive full reports, with accurate maps, both geographical and geological, of the whole country. For this purpose there would be required a military escort of sufficient strength to enable the party to push its examinations to the most remote parts of the State, now the constant haunts of Indians.

Formerly, of the profitable pursuits of New Mexico, "*stock raising*"

stood high upon the list, and although now sadly reduced by the continued inroads of the Navajoes and Apaches, it will again, when protected from their marauds, yield large profits to the proprietors. There are in New Mexico grazing lands of great extent, where countless flocks and herds may be reared at a very trifling expense. They require neither stabling nor forage during the winter; the nutritious "*gramma*," a species of grass found on the mountain sides and the adjoining uplands, affording abundant sustenance during that season. The climate, too, is well adapted to all kinds of stock, particularly sheep, which, owing to the dryness of the atmosphere, are almost exempt from "*rot*," and other diseases common in low countries. Some twenty or five-and-twenty years ago, before the hand of the red man had fallen so heavily upon them, the people of this State, as well as Chihuahua, sent annually to the city of Mexico vast numbers of sheep,* as well as cattle and mules. At this day not one thousand are sent from districts that formerly furnished their hundreds of thousands, such has been the rapacity and the relentless spirit of hostility of the Navajoes and Apaches.

The hill sides and the plains that were in days past covered with sheep and cattle, are now bare in many parts of the State; yet the work of plunder still goes on. The predatory operations of the two tribes just mentioned are even now carried on in the close vicinity of our military posts; the shepherds are pounced upon and shot with arrows to prevent their carrying information, and, with their spoil, the Indians dash at speed to the mountains, and are beyond reach before the loss is known. In this way they (I mean now the Apaches only) run the flocks from seventy to one hundred miles in twenty-four hours. And, consequently, out of ten thousand sheep that may be started, probably not more than one thousand will reach their destination. As the over-driven animals falter from exhaustion, those that do not fall dead by the way-side are lanced, as the Indians pass, to prevent their falling again into the hands of the Mexico. Thus the destruction is usually ten-fold the gain of the Indians. The Apache is satisfied with that, because all his care is to supply his present wants. The more provident Navajoe is more careful, because his principal object is to increase his stock at home. Within no more than three months past, between fifteen and twenty thousand sheep and several hundred head of cattle and mules have been driven from the Rio Grande, above Socorro, and from the vicinity of Vegos, and several shepherds killed, with entire impunity, by the two tribes already named.† They were on several occasions pursued, by the troops, but without success.

It is only necessary to free the mountains bounding the valley of the Rio Grande from the incursions of these Indians, in order to increase again in a few years the stock to its former numbers.

Then wool of improved quality, besides supplying the home consumption, would be sent to Missouri, and bring large returns; and horned cattle, mules, &c., raised at little or no expense, would secure large profits at the same market.

* The Chavez connexion, consisting of three or four families, residing below Albuquerque are known to have sent as many as 200,000 sheep to the city in one year.

† Since the above was written, an official report has been received that a flock of sixteen thousand had been carried off from the Puerco, opposite Cibolletta.

I place agriculture last, or as the least productive of wealth of the three principal industrial pursuits of New Mexico, (viz: mining, stock raising, and agriculture,) but I do so rather in reference to the past history and the future prospects of the State than its present circumstances. Formerly, under the Spanish government, *mines* were the most productive of wealth; towards the close of that era, and during the early period of the independence of Mexico, the immense droves of horses and mules, the herds and flocks which covered the face of the country, constituted the chief riches of this department. Of both these, in succession, the inhabitants of New Mexico have been despoiled by their more warlike borderers, and therefore at this day their soil is almost all that remains to them. Its produce, through sufferance of the Indians,* has saved them from starvation during the infliction of a two-fold scourge; but it has not, nor will it ever make them rich: such is the history of the past and the present.

The future of New Mexico, it is to be hoped, will disclose another picture: the Indians subdued; the hill-sides white with flocks; and the neglected mines again yielding up their hoards of the precious metals; and *then* the cultivation of the soil, although I believe it will always supply the wants of the inhabitants, will be productive of less wealth to the State than either of the other pursuits; because, were its products ten times what they ever can be, the isolated position of the State, and its entire want of the common and requisite facilities of transportation, either by water communication or otherwise, would render the products of agriculture, in whatever excess above the home consumption, unavailable for exportation. And here it may not be inappropriate to give the opinion of many persons here with whom I have conversed respecting the navigableness of the Rio Grande. Although no accurate knowledge is professed to have been derived from close examinations of the great bend of the Jornada, yet its course has, with extreme difficulty, been followed throughout, over steep mountains and rugged cliffs that overhang the water; and judging from the appearance of the river in its rapid and irregular descent through this pass, a distance of near one hundred and fifty miles, the opinion entertained was very decided that loaded boats would not be able to make the passage in safety even at the highest stage of water; at low water it would be perfectly impracticable. And above the Jornada, it will be borne in mind, lie more than three-fourths of the arable [land] of the river, or at least nine tenths of that of the State at large.

In future, as heretofore, it is probable that to the narrow valley of the Rio Grande (the "*river bottom*") will be confined the greater part of the strictly agricultural portion of the State. The affluents of the great river, the Pecos on the east, and the Puerco on the west, have along their courses large tracts of good land, but the want of timber on the first, and the too frequent occurrence of a partial or total want of water on the last, are serious hindrances to their improvement.

There are spots on each, where, but for the danger to be encountered from Indians, isolated settlements might be made to advantage; but these would add but little to the total amount.

The best lands on the Rio Grande are between Piña Blanca and the Jornada del Muerto—in a narrow strip on either bank of the river, that

* The Navajoes said, on a recent occasion, that their only reason for not exterminating the New Mexicans long ago was, that it was their interest to keep them as their shepherds.

would measure, following its meanders, about one hundred and eighty miles. These lands—the bottom lands—vary in depth from one-half of a mile to two miles and a half, but probably do not exceed on an average one mile.

The soil is light, but where within reach of irrigation is enriched by the fructifying waters of the river, and produces abundant and almost un-failing crops of wheat, corn, beans and onions.

The uplands, even on the very borders of the river, and although the soil be good, are unproductive, for the reason that irrigation is impracticable in the ordinary way. If, by *boring*, water in sufficient quantity for irrigation could be got, many large tracts of uplands, now worthless except for grazing, would possibly become as productive as the bottoms; but this in both respects is problematical.

At points where bodies of this land are found sufficiently large to warrant the expense, another mode more eligible may be adopted. The fall of the river in its passage through this part of the State being about two and a half feet to the mile, the distance it may be necessary to bring the water from above is easily calculated; thus, a large “acéquia” or canal, opened five or eight miles above, would throw its branches in every direction over land from twelve to twenty feet above the level of the river, at the point cultivated.

On the march from El Paso del Norte to Santa Fe the river lands were carefully noted, and a rough estimate made of the amount at present in cultivation, &c., &c.: it is given here, and may be regarded as an approximation.

On the left or east bank of the river, on the line above indicated, from El Paso to Don Aña, there is but little land under cultivation, say thirty-two hundred acres; and as much more cultivable still vacant; while there is along the river bank at least forty-five thousand acres worthless for agricultural purposes.

Twelve miles above Don Aña commences the noted Jornada, crossing the high table-land that fills the great western bend of the river—a stretch of ninety miles without water. At a point twenty-five miles from the north end of the Jornada, by taking a trail, (impracticable for wagons,) is found at the distance of six miles westward the *Ojo del Muerto*, or Dead Man's spring, where there is running water; but the fatigue of the animals occasioned by this extra march of twelve miles is not compensated by the draught of water; and most trains, unless they can command time to lie by here, push on to the end of the journey without halting. During the rainy season two or three pools may be found, containing perhaps water enough for 250 or 300 animals—not more; and this may not last three weeks after the rain ceases.

Around this bend impassable mountains close in upon the river banks as far as Fray Cristobal, eighteen miles below Valverde; and from Don Aña to Lopez, a distance of one hundred and forty miles, there is not a human habitation; that of Valverde having been abandoned many years since in consequence of overflow.

From the north end of Jornada to Piña Blanca there is at present under cultivation about sixty miles of bottom land, with an average depth of one mile, giving sixty square miles, or thirty-eight thousand four hundred acres; of cultivable land unimproved about fifty square miles, or thirty-two thousand acres; and of land uncultivable—the greater part entirely

sterile—about seventy square miles, or forty-four thousand eight hundred acres.

The different qualities of land (it will be understood) are in greater or less bodies interposed amongst each other along the whole line, though the best lands, and in the largest bodies, lie between Lopez and Algodones.

On the right or west bank of the river, following its meanders, there may be from El Paso to Piña Blanca about forty-seven square miles, or thirty thousand two hundred and eighty acres, now under cultivation; of good land vacant, one hundred and eighty miles, or one hundred and fifteen thousand two hundred acres; and of land waste, and fit only for grazing, two hundred and three square miles, or one hundred and thirty thousand acres.

Here also, on the right bank of the river, the good, bad, and indifferent lands are intermixed in tracts of various sizes along the route.

In addition to the foregoing there are, in insulated tracts, many considerable bodies of arable land, the principal of which are here enumerated.

First, the beautiful valley of Taos, begirt almost by the Rocky mountains, their spurs and other detached peaks. The valley may be from twenty-five to thirty miles in circumference, and may contain, immediately on the margins of the several streams that unite near the town of (San Fernandez de) Taos, forming the Rio de Taos, and thence to its debouche into the Rio Grande, about fifteen thousand acres now in cultivation, and ten thousand acres arable vacant. The remainder, though the soil is generally good, lies too high for irrigation in the ordinary way, even supposing that the streams afforded water enough, which is doubtful.

Passing from the valley, a spur of the Rocky mountains, there is from La Joya to Cañada a stretch along the Rio Grande of about fifteen miles, with an average depth of two miles, say twenty thousand acres of good cultivable land, little of which is improved.

Crossing the Rio Grande at Cañada, we ascend the Rio Chamas to the town of Abiquiu, adjoining which the river bottom is cultivated for about three miles, with an average width of one and a half, or twenty-eight hundred and eighty acres. The unimproved lands on this stream, equally good in quality and position, amount to thrice that quantity; in this estimate both banks of the river are included.

Recrossing the Rio Grande there will be found, at Rayado and Morotown, some twenty thousand acres of good land, about one-tenth of which is improved; at the former a portion of the land lies high, but may be irrigated by bringing the water some miles.

Around Las Vegas, Upper and Lower Tecoleté and Barclay's Trading-house, there may be one hundred thousand acres, of which nearly one-fifth is improved.

On the Pecos river, at the towns of Pecos, San José, San Miguel, Anton Chico, &c., probably six thousand acres in cultivation; and thrice that amount of arable land vacant.

Of several of the last named bodies of land it should be remarked that doubt exists whether the streams on which they lie will afford a sufficiency to irrigate the whole of what is actually within reach of their waters.

Returning westward, we have on the Rio de Santa Fé, below the town, not more than five thousand acres in cultivation: all that around still va-

cant, is worthless for agricultural purposes. And from Cañada to Peña Blanca, along the river, there is but little good land on this side. The lands on the Pecos, as far as yet settled, are included in the above estimates. Below the settlements there is timber at but two points. These are the *Bosque Redondo*, or round forest, and the *Bosque Grande*, or great forest. The latter, in or about the parallel of Valverde, extends along the river for fifteen miles, with a breadth of eight or ten miles, including both banks. Sixty miles above is the former, lying equally on both banks, with a diameter of ten miles. Each has good timber in abundance, but it is impossible to say what quantity of land adjoining either is fit for the plough; and they are the only points on the Pecos below the Anton Chico settlement where wood enough even for fuel is found.

The Puerco and its west tributary, the Rio San José, the Rio de Jemez, and the country thence along the Rio Grande to the mouth of the Rio Chamas, have some small tracts of land in cultivation, principally by Pueblos. I have been unable to ascertain the amount from any reliable source, and therefore have not included it in the estimate. But it is believed, as mentioned above, that the frequent sinking of the Puerco in deep sands, under which, upon a hard clay, it follows its course for miles, reappearing at intervals in the form of pools, until finally lost entirely before reaching the Rio Grande, will prevent its ever adding much to the agricultural produce of the State.

On the headwaters of the Arkansas, I have been told by old trappers, there is a beautiful country of great extent, where the land, well watered and well timbered, is sufficiently level for farming. They expressed the belief that good crops of wheat and corn might be raised here without irrigation, the rains being seasonable and sufficient.

More minute examination of this country will be necessary to determine its character and value.

I shall now proceed to recapitulate and sum up what may be considered the agricultural districts of New Mexico; not including any portion of the State now held by wild Indians.

	Land now in cultivation— acres.	Land cultivable now vacant— acres.
Left or east bank of Rio Grande—		
From El Paso to Don Aña	3,200	3,200
From Fray Cristobal to Peña Blanca	38,600	32,000
Right or west bank of Rio Grande—		
From El Paso to Peña Blanca	30,280	115,200
Valley of Taos	15,000	10,000
On Rio Grande—		
From La Joya to Cañada	2,000	18,000
Valley of Chamas—		
At Abiquiu	2,880	8,840
Rayado and Morotown	2,000	18,000
Las Vegas, Upper and Lower Tecoleté, and Barclay's Trading-house	20,000	80,000
Pecos, San José, San Miguel, and Anton Chico	6,000	18,000
Santa Fé	5,000	
Total number of acres	124,760	303,240

From the foregoing statement, based upon close personal observations and much minute inquiry, it would appear that more than one half of the arable land, either improved or vacant, as far as now known with any degree of certainty, lies in the immediate valley of the Rio Grande.

The method adopted in estimating, it is true, is rude, but neither time nor opportunity admitted of a more regular and satisfactory examination. The figures, I may assert with confidence, are not too high; nor do I believe they will be found very greatly below the truth with respect to the lands specified; what amount of farming lands there may be in addition to these, further examination will determine.

In looking at the past, in the history of New Mexico, it is clear that the fruits of labor in the principal pursuits of life above mentioned, have, up to the time of the cession of the territory to the United States, been blighted by the presence of formidable tribes of Indians, who *still* infest the country; and it would from certain indications appear that the future prosperity of the State to arise from the steady, uninterrupted prosecution of these pursuits, will in a great measure depend on the impression *now* to be made on these Indians.

It may be apprehended, that if they are not in the beginning impressed with the ability and the settled purpose of the United States to chastise those who plunder and murder its citizens—if acts of this kind, now of almost monthly occurrence and utterly beyond the power of the present military force to check, are continued longer unpunished, the Indians will hold us in the contempt with which they now look upon the Mexicans, whom they have wantonly robbed and murdered for two centuries past. And the inevitable consequence will be, sooner or later, a *war*, more or less general, with the surrounding tribes.

This subject appears to be so closely blended with those to which my attention has been directed, I trust a few remarks on the *present strength and temper* of these Indians may not be unacceptable to the department. The information has been gathered piecemeal, and therefore may be regarded as the collective knowledge of several persons who have seen much of the different tribes.

Of the eight tribes of wild Indians who inhabit the mountains and plains of New Mexico and the contiguous country, the Navajoes and Apaches are the most formidable as enemies, the most troublesome as neighbors.

The first are, with the exception of the Moqui, the most civilized: they are without exception the most wealthy of all. They are not so warlike nor so bold in attack as the Apaches; but they are numerous, well equipped, and occupy a country well fortified by nature. Their country, extending from the San Juan to the Gila, with a breadth of 150 miles, consists chiefly of mountains and high table lands, and is full of fastnesses. Their possessions consist of large stocks of horses, mules, horned cattle and sheep, which are perhaps extravagantly represented, by persons who have had intercourse with them, as numerous beyond calculation—many times more so than those of all New Mexico at present. There may be great extravagance in all this, but it is well known that these Indians do possess stock, more or less. If such be the case, and they are supposed to have retained one out of ten, or even one out of every twenty, of the countless flocks and herds they have driven off from the Rio Grande within the last twenty years, to increase their own stock,

their progeny would in less time have swelled the amount to extravagant numbers. Although they have no permanent villages, they cultivate the soil to a considerable extent, making periodical visits to their fields at planting and harvest times. In this way they make a sufficiency of grain for all their wants, besides a few vegetables and fruits. They are said to be intelligent and industrious, and their manufactures (blankets and coarse cloths,) in their neatness and finish, go far to prove this; these articles being made (of wool of their own growing) not only for their own use, but for traffic also to a large amount.

For some years past they are believed to have steadily increased in numbers, and to count now about eighteen hundred lodges, which, at six per lodge, would give ten thousand eight hundred souls.

From the aptness of these Indians and the advancement they have made in the arts of civilization, it occurs to the mind that they might with proper management be induced to settle themselves permanently, as the Pueblos have done; after which they might be advantageously employed in an attempt to reclaim their more wild and savage neighbors. And the accomplishment of an object so important would seem worthy of notice.

The forays which the Apaches make upon the Mexicans are incited by want; they have nothing of their own, and must plunder or starve. This is not the case with the Navajoes—they have enriched themselves by appropriating the flocks and herds of an unresisting people, and cannot offer the plea of necessity.

In the first place, before anything can be done with this people, it is believed it will be indispensable to open the communication with them in their own country, in the presence of a sufficient military force to impress them seriously with the weight and importance of the conference; that the object is not an idle "*talk*"—a treaty such as they have been in the habit from year to year of making with the New Mexicans, to be continued in force only until their own immediate objects are quietly attained—but a treaty, the violation of which will bring upon them war in all its severity. Then (the treaty being concluded) let the first offence be so punished as to prove that we are in earnest. Forbearance exercised towards the Navajoes would be mistaken humanity; and the blood of our own citizens would be the fruits of it. It would be dealing with them too much in the style they have been accustomed to; and the only effect would be to excite their contempt for us.

But I am satisfied that the presence of a strong military force in their country—the Navajoes muster over two thousand warriors—would insure the observance of any treaty it might be important to make with them. Their thievish propensities could then be controlled; and they might in a short time, by judicious management, be induced to give up their roving habits and settle themselves in permanent towns, in the vicinity of their fields. They could, with little labor, live well on the increase of their flocks, and the bountiful product of their soil, which, with little attention, gives growth to noble crops of wheat, as well as corn. Nor would the change of life to them be very great.

If the Navajoes are first secured, and their chiefs enlisted in our cause, their influence may at once be brought to bear upon the other tribes. They entertain the most friendly relations with their northern neighbors, the Utahs; as do the latter with the tribe adjoining on the east, the Jica-

rilla Apaches: and by the last the communication is kept up with the several bands of their own tribes on the east of the State, and so on to the Gila bands on the south. And here if the Gila Apaches prove refractory, the Navajoes may be brought against them without difficulty, for they are far from friendly now, and frequently have a brush when they meet.

To an end so desirable, the Pueblos of the State might in the first place be well employed in bringing about the reformation of the Navajoes; although at present they are not friendly.

The Moqui Indians, who live to the southwest of the Navajoes, are weak in numbers, and are too remote to give annoyance to the State, were they so disposed. They have, however, no such disposition; but on the contrary are pacific, honest, and hospitable; and are, besides, the most civilized of the western Indians. They always proved themselves good warriors in their former contests with the Navajoes and Apaches; and though much reduced in numbers by their more powerful enemies, were never subdued.

The cultivation of a friendly understanding with them might be repaid at some future day, by their services in various ways, as guides, &c., in the event of a war with either of their old enemies. The Moqui live in permanent villages; cultivate large farms; have a large amount of stock; and make blankets and cloths from wool of their own growing. The number of their lodges is about three hundred and fifty, which, at seven per lodge, would give a population of twenty-four hundred and fifty souls.

On the north of the Navajoes are the Utahs, occupying the territory between the San Juan and the head of the Arkansas—a rugged country, but well stocked with game. They have neither permanent villages nor cultivated fields, and subsist chiefly on game. They are a warlike people, and much attached to a wandering life, frequently extending their excursions to California. Altogether they amount to four or five thousand, though there are rarely at a time more than one thousand immediately on the borders of the State. These people do not extend their forays further south than Abiquiu, Taos, and Morotown; and in these they are very often united with the Jicarilla Apaches. In event of an active campaign being set on foot for the purpose of punishing the outrages committed recently by the latter, the Utahs would undoubtedly render them great assistance, covertly, and at the same time send in to inform us of their determination to remain neutral. It is not probable, however, they would openly join them.

Adjoining the Utahs on the northeast are the Sheyennes and Arrapahoes, who range from the headwaters of the Arkansas eastward upon the plains. They subsist entirely upon the buffalo; commit no depredations; are friendly to the white man—though in the event of a war with other tribes, could not perhaps be depended upon. Together, they amount to about three thousand five hundred souls.

The eastern part of New Mexico (up to the Rio Pecos) is a part of the range of the Comanches, and they visit these grounds at least once a year, generally after the breaking up of their winter quarters near the sources of the Brazos and Trinity rivers of Texas. They rarely commit depredations in New Mexico; and their movements are principally of interest to the State, from their intimate connexion with the Apaches. They meet the latter on the Pecos, and there concert their campaigns into Chihuahua and Sonora. From these departments they annually bring off large

numbers of mules; and often from Durango, into the centre of which they sometimes make their way in company with the Mescaleros, (Apaches.) And from these departments they also bring off many prisoners.

Again, on their return they halt at the Pecos, and are now met by the New Mexican traders. Their mules are many of them exchanged with the latter for arms and ammunition, cloths, and paint, &c. &c.; the remainder are driven with them on their return, and their meat eaten until they again enter the buffalo range.

Their prisoners are said to amount to large numbers; they consist principally of women and children, though men also are often brought over. A New Mexican, living at San Miguel, recently returned from a large camp of Comanches and Apaches, on the Pecos, stated that in the camp of the former there were almost as many Mexican slaves—women and children—as Indians. It will be a difficult matter to induce them to restore these prisoners. And until this unlicensed trade is broken up, their predatory incursions into Mexico can never be checked.

The Comanches, divided into three bands, have in all upwards of twelve thousand souls.

The *Kayugas*, who occupy the country west of the Brasos, are rarely seen on the borders of New Mexico. They do not exceed two thousand souls.

Lastly, the several bands of the *Apaches*. These Indians, owing to their numerical strength, their bold and independent character, and their immemorial predatory habits, will, it is to be apprehended, prove more difficult to reclaim or subdue than any other of the (strictly speaking) New Mexican tribes.

From the earliest accounts we have of them, they have been regarded by their kindred tribes as *mountain robbers*. On the Gila, at the period of the Spanish conquest, they were in the habit of despoiling the fields of their more industrious and pacific neighbors, the Moqui. By these they have latterly been successfully resisted. But the inhabitants of Chihuahua and Sonora are still groaning under their relentless spoliations. They complain bitterly; but continue to submit without resistance.

The Apaches, divided into six bands, inhabit the country enclosed between the eastern chain of the Rio Grande mountains and the river Pecos, from the northern to the southern boundary of New Mexico, and on the south the country bordering on the Gila river—thus completing the chain by uniting with the Utahs on the north, and with the territory of the Navajoes on the west.

Of the different bands, the *Jicarilla* Apaches, on the extreme north, are one of the smallest, but, at the same time, one of the most troublesome of the tribe. They have latterly committed more murders on our people than all the others together. Ranging from the upper Arkansas to the Canadian, their trail crosses the Independence and Santa Fe road between the "Point of Rocks" and the "Wagon Mound" or Santa Clara spring, and this ground is known as the scene of several recent and deplorable tragedies. They have suffered severely in two or three conflicts with our troops during the past year, and are supposed now to number less than one hundred warriors—four hundred souls. They (as well as all the other bands of this tribe) have no permanent villages—no fields of grain; and fearing collision with the stronger tribes that roam the buffalo plains, the

Jicarillas depend for their subsistence chiefly on the success of their marauding parties.

This band is considered as incorrigible, and it is believed they will continue to rob and murder our citizens until they are exterminated. I know of no means that could be employed to reclaim them.

Next in succession, southwardly, are the *White Mountain Apaches*, numbering one hundred and fifty warriors; they are in close communication with the *Sacramento Apaches*, who have about the same number of warriors. These two bands inhabit the White and Sacramento mountains, and together they range the country extending north and south from the junction of the Gallinos with the Pecos to the lower end of the Jornada del Muerto. They continue to drive off the stock and to kill the Mexican shepherds both in the vicinity of Vegas and along the Rio Grande from Saudival's to Don Aña.

Next come the *Apaches Mercaleros*, consisting of two bands, under the chiefs Marco and Gomez; the former (the more northerly) having two hundred warriors; the latter, four hundred. They hold the country east of the Rio Grande from the Gaudalupe mountains to Presidio del Norte.

These two bands are the strongest and the most warlike and fearless of their tribe. They have rarely molested the inhabitants of New Mexico north of El Paso; nor were they unfriendly to United States citizens whom they met on the road, until a feeling of hostility was aroused by the infamous attack of Glanton, an American citizen in the pay of the government of Chihuahua, on a part of Gomez's band in 1849. They have, however, for years, in conjunction with the Comanches, committed fearful havoc in Chihuahua and Sonora, and like them have carried off women and children, though not by any means to the same extent.

These bands have no manufactures whatever; and having no agriculture and but little game in their own country, they subsist in a great measure on the meat of horses, mules, and sometimes cattle, driven from Mexico by their foraging parties. They are not, however, altogether without a farinaceous food. A kind of cake or paste is made from the mezquite bean, and the root of the maguay plant is roasted and eaten.

The *Gila Apaches*, subdivided into three or four smaller bands make their home—if an Apache can be said to have a home—on the Gila river.

Their foraging parties sometimes make their appearance on the Rio Grande, near Don Aña; but, by far the greater portion of their supplies are brought from Chihuahua. They are bold and independent, and together muster about four hundred warriors.

To take into view the different bands collectively as a tribe, and the extent of country held by the tribe; to consider their restless habits, their aversion to permanent villages and the labor of agriculture; at the same time bearing in mind the scarcity of game throughout a great part of their country, and therefore the temptation, in fact the almost necessity, to poach upon their neighbors, and it would seem like the undertaking of a tedious task to attempt to reclaim the Apaches. It is true, it will require time to subdue their propensity to plunder, to control their movements, to settle them in permanent villages, and to induce them to commence the cultivation of the soil; and until this is effected, they must continue to plunder, or they must starve; still, it may be possible to accomplish all this, by judicious management, in a few years' time. During at least

the early part of this period it would, of course, be necessary to feed these Indians; to give them cattle and sheep, and to encourage the rearing of them; to employ suitable persons—New Mexicans would be the best, as the Apaches understand their language—to teach them how to prepare their fields and plant their corn for the first year or two. And the greatest difficulty, perhaps, would be found, in carrying out this part of the scheme, to overcome the pride of the Apache warriors, who think any pursuits but those of war and the chase beneath their dignity.

From the following little incident may be drawn very fair conclusions as to the present condition and temper of the Apaches:

In March last Mr. F. X. Aubrey, on his way from San Antonio to El Paso with a train of wagons, fell in with *Marco's band* near the Limpia river. The former had with him near sixty men, which perhaps had some influence on the character of his reception. An amicable meeting, however, took place, and some mules were obtained from the Indians.

In the "talk" held between the parties, Mr. Aubrey told Marco that the United States desired to be on friendly terms with him; and that, consequently, he must not allow his people to kill our citizens, or carry off their stock. This he promised to do. He was then told he must also give up plundering the Mexicans. After a long pause he replied, "I had supposed that my brother was a man of good sense. Has he, then, seen between the Pecos and the Limpia game enough to feed 3,000 people? We have had for a long time no other food than the meat of Mexican cattle and mules, and we must make use of it still, or perish." He said subsequently, "If your people will give us cattle to feed our families, we will no longer take from the Mexicans."

If these people were maintained in idleness, they would, perhaps, remain quiet; but whether they could be induced to take upon themselves the task of providing for their future subsistence, by their own manual labor, is a question that nothing but actual experiment will solve.

The whole of the Indians of the country are ignorant of the power of the United States, and also of its views as regards themselves. And it would do much to enlighten them as to the policy of our government if delegations from the Pueblos and the principal wild tribes were called to the United States. A journey through the States, and a visit to our principal cities, would likewise impress them as to the means and resources of the country to carry on a war. If, however, by such means as have been referred to, these people may not be reclaimed, it is very certain that a considerable augmentation of the armed force will be required to control them.

Within the last hour, information of a perfectly reliable character has been received that near Padillas, about seventy miles south of Santa Fe, seven thousand sheep were driven off by Navajoes a few days since; and a few miles lower on the river, six hundred; the shepherd of the last flock being pierced with fourteen arrows.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. A. McCALL,

Major 3d Infantry, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel.

Hon. GEO. W. CRAWFORD, Secretary of War.

[Copies of the State constitution, in the Spanish and the English language, enclosed herewith.]

P. S.—The returns in the office of the secretary of the Territory show the following number of votes polled at the recent elections. No estimate of the population can be made from them, as the number entitled to vote, who *did not* vote, is unknown.

Number of votes polled for the constitution	- - - -	8,371
Number of votes polled against the constitution	- - - -	39
		<hr/>
		8,410

<i>For Governor</i> —Connelly	- - - -	4,604	votes.
Baca	- - - -	2,706	"
		<hr/>	
		7,310	"

<i>Lieutenant Governor</i> —Alvarez	- - - -	4,586	votes.
St. Vrain	- - - -	3,465	"
		<hr/>	
		8,051	"

N. B.—The following is believed to be a pretty accurate estimate of the strength of the Apaches, and also of the other New Mexican Indians. I am aware that the Apaches and Utahs are by some persons set down as above 10,000 each; of the Pueblos at from 12,000 to 15,000; but I feel confident they have been overrated:

	Warriors.	Souls.
<i>Apaches</i> , Jicarillas	- - - - 100	400
White mountains	- - - - 150	600
Sacramento mountains	- - - - 150	600
Mercaleros—		
Marco's band, 200 warriors, 1,000 souls	} 600	2,800
Gomez's band, 400 warriors, 1,800 souls		
Gila band—three or four subdivisions	- 400	1,600
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total of Apaches	- 1,400	6,000

Wild Indians of New Mexico.

	Lodges.	Souls.
West of Rio Grande: 1. Navajoes	- 1,500	10,000
2. Moqui	- 350	2,500
North of the State: 3. Utah, on the State line	- -	1,000
far west	- -	4,000
4. Sheyennes	- 300	2,000
5. Arrapahoes	- 300	1,500
East of Pecos: 6. Comanches	- 2,500	12,000
7. Hayaguias	- 400	2,000
West of Pecos, and south of the State: 8. Apaches, warriors 1,400	- -	6,000
		<hr/>
Grand total		41,000

Not including W. Utahs 37,500

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Philadelphia, December 26, 1850.

GENERAL: In obedience to instructions from the War Department, embraced in a letter from your office dated the 24th June, 1850, I have now the honor to submit a report on the several subjects therein referred to, viz:

"1. The probable number of lives lost and of persons taken captives by the Indians, within the last eighteen months, in New Mexico; also the probable value of property stolen or destroyed within the same period."

In pursuing my inquiries on this subject I found it extremely difficult, although I visited towns or settlements where, or in the neighborhood of which, depredations had been committed by the Navajoes, Utahs, or Apaches within 12 or 18 months previous, to collect from the people information at all explicit or reliable; while the cases reported at the headquarters of the department, or the office of the Secretary of State, do not cover two thirds, perhaps not one-half, of all that occurred. However, on the northern frontier, from Albuquerque to Las Vegas, there were enumerated to me about 53 persons who have been killed on that line within twelve months, from September 1, 1849, to September 1, 1850. In the six months preceding there were some shepherds killed at different points along that line, probably 10 or 12, though I could not arrive at the number with any precision. These murders were committed by the Navajoes, Utahs, and Jicarilla Apaches, but principally by the latter. In the lower country, and along the Rio Grande, from Santa Fe to El Paso, about 20 persons have been killed within eighteen months—these were by the Navajoes, and White Mountain and Sacramento Mountain Apaches. The number of captives carried off from New Mexico within the same period amount in all to 13 that are known and enumerated. The probability, however, is, that many obscure persons have been killed and children carried off besides those named.

If we assume the total ascertained of killed to be 83, and of captives to be 13, I incline to the belief that from 15 to 30 per cent. might be safely added to these figures without exceeding the truth.

As far as I could ascertain positively, by summing up individual cases, the number of animals driven off by these Indians within eighteen months prior to the 1st September, 1850, is as follows:

Horses 181, which at \$40 each is	\$7,240
Mules 402, which at \$50 each is	20,100
Horned cattle, (many of them work oxen,) 788, at \$20	15,760
Sheep, 47,300, at \$1 50	70,950

Total 114,050

To this amount 50 per cent. may be added. And when it is taken into consideration that for twenty years past the flocks and herds of this people have been yearly diminishing under the constant ravages of the wild tribes, and that districts which formerly were covered with "stock" are now almost bare, the above amounts must be set down as heavy losses. For further information on this point I beg leave to refer to my report of the 15th July last, now on file at the department.

"2. The capacity of the people of New Mexico to resist the incursions of the Indians, and the necessary military force to secure protection."

With regard to the first clause of the inquiry, the history of the country during the period of 200 years past illustrates the fact which impresses itself on every one who visits New Mexico, that the people within themselves are altogether incapable of resisting the inroads of the Indians into the very heart of their territory. They have been from generation to generation so deeply imbued with the fear of their savage neighbors, that it is only necessary to raise the cry of "los Indios," and a dozen of them will run from a couple of Apaches armed with lance and bow. On several expeditions against these Indians they have been organized into companies, and have marched with the regular troops, but their chief exploits have been to secure the booty after the enemy had been attacked and routed by the regulars. In most of these instances they have been allowed, as an encouragement, to possess themselves of the entire spoil; but while this continues to be their sole object, as it does now seem to be, they will not greatly expose their persons in the conflict; and I should therefore rate their capacity for Indian warfare at very little above "zero."

Better auxiliaries may be found in the Pueblo (or civilized) Indians of the Territory; and I would here respectfully repeat what I had the honor to present to the notice of the department in my report of the 15th July, viz: that advantages may accrue from extending to these people a marked kindness, and securing their confidence in the friendship and justice of our government.

In replying to the latter clause of the second query, I would in the first place beg leave to invite attention to the facts stated in a preceding paragraph, *i. e.* the known losses sustained yearly and monthly by the inhabitants of this Territory from the inroads of large tribes of wild Indians, whose country envelopes the Territory without interval on the north, south, east, and west. From the facts to which I refer, it must appear either that the military force *at present* in New Mexico is idle and inefficient, or that the extent of frontier intrusted to its protection is out of proportion to its strength and the character of its organization.

A single glance at the map, and a reference to the total number of troops for duty, as stated in the last report from the ninth department headquarters, will clearly demonstrate the truth of the last position. The question is, what (at the lowest calculation) is "the necessary military force to secure protection?"

In stationing a military force here, there are, apparently, two objects in view, requiring separate fields of action. The first is to afford present protection to the lives and property of the inhabitants; the second, to effectually check the marauding spirit of the Indians, and, at a subsequent period, to induce them to dwell in fixed habitations, to cultivate the soil to some extent, and to raise their own stock. The first must be effected, as far as practicable, by stationing small bodies of troops in the principal settlements. The second can only be accomplished by the permanent establishment of a strong force within the Indian country. To do this, I should answer that, for present service, the lowest figure at which this force can be put is 2,200 (two thousand two hundred) effective men; of whom, at least, 1,400 (fourteen hundred) should be mounted.

The question may, perhaps, be more satisfactorily answered by an illustration of the mode of warfare and pillage pursued by the Indians against whom the troops are to act, and a description of the country in which they are to operate, premising that the tribes above named (independently of the Comanches) count from 4,500 to 5,000 warriors. If we take Santa

Fé, the seat of government and principal depot of munitions, as the central point, then the northern line of posts, for defence or protection, may be drawn through Abiquiu, on the northwest; Taos, Rayado, and Mora, on the north, to Las Vegas on the northeast. These are all important and thriving settlements; but each one is separated from the next by rugged mountain regions of from 20 to 45 miles in width, running back into the Indian country, and thus affording from the latter easy and concealed approaches on the flanks of all of them. For the protection of life, of the crops, of the working animals, and all property immediately around the homesteads of these people, a small force at each of the points named is considered to be sufficient. But the principal wealth of the people is in their flocks and herds; and these must be sent (particularly in winter) into narrow mountain glades, affording fine pasturage, at the distance of from five to twenty miles from the settlements, where they are left for months at a time under charge of a few simple and unarmed shepherds. Here they are an easy prey to the Utahs and Jicarilla Apaches, who, crawling upon the listless shepherds, shoot them with arrows to prevent their carrying information, and then drive off the stock with impunity; or if a shepherd, escaping, brings intelligence to the nearest military post, experience has shown that the pursuit is almost always fruitless.

The other line of settlement that should be occupied is from Santa Fé southward, along the valley of the Rio Grande, to El Paso. Here small garrisons at Albuquerque (or Bernallio,) Cibolletta, Socorro (or 27 miles below, opposite Valverde,) Don Aña, and El Paso (or San Elizario,) would, in the same way, give security to the homesteads, but nothing more. The only way in which a military force can be advantageously and effectively employed to put an end to Indian spoliations in New Mexico is to post them, not in our settlements, or on our borders, but in the heart of the Indian country. And here they must be in sufficient strength to awe the Indians—to punish them in their strongholds for the offences they commit beyond their own boundaries. Three stations of this kind are deemed requisite, viz: one in the Navajoe country, near the *cañon of Chi*; one in the Apache country east, somewhere on the eastern slope of the Sacramento mountains, where water, grass, and timber, of excellent quality, may be found; and one in the south on the Gila river, or near the old copper mines. The latter is a very eligible position. It is a high country, with a pure air, and possessing all the requisites for the establishment of a military post, together with abundance of game. At the first two posts there should be from 450 to 500 men each; at the last 350. At most of the other points named above, a single company would be sufficient.

On completing the tour of the military posts in this Territory, it appears to me that the following would be a proper disposition of the troops at this time:

	Organization.	Probable effective strength.
Abiquiu, one company of infantry	84	75
Taos, one company of infantry	84	75
Rayado,* two companies of dragoons	170	150
Las Vegas, one company of infantry	84	75

* Rayado and Cibolletta are positions from which operations may be successfully carried into the Indian country. (See inspection reports, Nos. 5 and 7.)

	Organization.	Probable effective strength.
Santa Fé, one company of infantry	84	75
Albuquerque, one company of infantry	84	75
Cibolletta,* one company of dragoons and one company of infantry	169	150
Socorro, one company of dragoons	85	75
Don Aña, one company of dragoons and one company of infantry	169	150
El Paso, one company of infantry	84	75
Navajoe country, four companies of dragoons, one company of artillery with battery of mountain howitzer, and one company of infantry	508	450
Apache country, five companies of dragoons, and one company of artillery with battery of mountain howitzer	509	450
Gila river, three companies of dragoons and one company of infantry	339	300
Grand total	2,453	2,175

Owing to the usual casualties of service, I do not consider that the average effective strength of companies can be safely estimated at more than seventy-five total.

The following troops are at present in New Mexico:

	Organization.	Total present September 30, 1850.
7 companies of dragoons	595	334
2 do artillery	168	99
10 do infantry	840	554
	1,603	987
Add to the above one full regiment of dragoons or mounted riflemen		
—10 companies of riflemen	840 (probable strength)	750
	2,443	1,737

The above total present in New Mexico on the 30th of September last, viz: 987, would give only an average of 52 total to a company. Say, then, that each company is filled to 75 total, there will be—

19 companies, at 75 each	1,425
Add 10 companies of rifles, at 75 each	750
This will give a total of	2,175

Thus, one regiment of mounted riflemen *in addition* to the force now in New Mexico may be considered a sufficient or necessary military force to secure protection—but this is placing it at the very lowest figure at which it can safely be put.

The nature of the service in this country requires mounted troops almost exclusively; the distribution of supplies and munitions from the general depots to the frontier posts, the frequent visits of staff officers (paymasters, quartermasters, etc.) from post to post in the necessary discharge of their duties, the transmittal of orders and reports of constant occurrence in the usual course of service, all require mounted escorts or express riders.

The law authorizing the mounting of a portion of the infantry regiments would in some measure supply the deficiency of cavalry in the organization of the army, but there are many objections to this. One alone, it is sufficient to cite, viz: the *increased expense*. This my own observation satisfies me will be the result in a few years of the adoption of this system. A better one, I believe, would be to change the organization of one or two of the foot regiments and convert them into *mounted riflemen*.

Among the advantages of adopting this course in preference to raising new regiments the following may be named: The officers of the infantry in general, particularly from the rank of captain descending, are fine horsemen. Their lives are passed almost entirely on the frontiers: hunting is a favorite recreation with them, and a majority of them keep their own horses; they are consequently good judges of horses, and well skilled in every respect in their management and treatment. They would, therefore, become at once capable and efficient cavalry officers, for they are already well grounded in the tactics. Again, the experience of 25 years has shown me that on an average about one-half the infantry soldiers are more or less accustomed to horses, and would be *at least* on an equality with dragoon *recruits* in all that regards the horse. The remainder, with some exceptions, (who might be transferred to other foot regiments,) would in a few months manage their horses sufficiently well for all service on this frontier; whereas they would possess over any newly-organized regiments the all-important qualifications of discipline and a knowledge of the use of their arms.

I advance, General, for the consideration of the department, the proposition to change the organization of one or *two* of the foot regiments; not as an expedient to remove the necessity so loudly calling for an addition to the army of one or more new regiments of dragoons or mounted riflemen, but because I am persuaded that the nature of the service to be required of the army for the next ten years will be such as to require that the *cavalry arm* shall greatly predominate in its organization.

“3. The best means of supplying the troops in New Mexico with recruits, horses, and subsistence.”

In order to keep the companies in New Mexico full at the present standard, recruiting in the Atlantic and middle States must be chiefly depended upon; re-enlistment will do but little towards it.

While in this Territory my attention was requested by an officer of the medical department to the subject of the enlistment of hospital stewards especially for that office; and I have pleasure in submitting his views, viz: that they should be enlisted or employed especially for that duty; that their pay should be increased to that of paymaster's clerk. The advantages would be, that they would only be removed from the hospital at the expiration of their service; that the hazard incurred in putting men whose previous education has not fitted them for the duty into the hospital is very great; and that by the course recommended, the government would

save largely in men, as well as in medicines and hospital stores; that the increased pay proposed would bring into the service graduates of the schools of pharmacy of good character.

With respect to *horses*, they cannot be procured of sufficient size and strength in the Territory. It will, therefore, be necessary to purchase in the middle States. But the horses from Missouri and Illinois, from which States most of the horses now in the Territory have been brought, are not found to stand the change of climate as well as those from a lower and more temperate latitude, as Tennessee and Kentucky. All horses, however, even from the last named States, experience more or less the ill effects of the change, and many droop and fall away, although not in active service; so that as a general rule, a twelvemonth elapses after horses are brought into this country before they are acclimated, or have recovered their natural vigor and endurance. The average duration of horses here, I have learned from dragoon officers, has but little exceeded three years; this may be owing in some measure to their having been put upon hard service too soon after their arrival.

In view of this I would recommend that grazing farms be established, which I believe in ten years would save the government a large outlay in horses. Let three and four-year old colts; bought in *Tennessee*, be kept on these farms for twelve or eighteen months before they are put in service, and they will last at least twice as long as those above referred to. Whilst in England, in 1848, I conversed much with cavalry officers on the subject of horses and their treatment in that service. I was informed that colts purchased at three years of age, and placed on duty with the recruiting or depot squadrons, where they were lightly exercised for three years before being put into the service squadrons; served, after joining the service squadrons, on an average ten years, or to the age of sixteen. This fact was established by a careful examination of the records of the service during a long period.

There is every probability that the service in New Mexico will for many years to come require the maintenance on the part of the United States of a large mounted force. And there is little doubt that, to make this force efficient, a provision of the kind recommended is advisable. On more than one occasion the Apaches have escaped from dragoons (when almost within their grasp) where the fleetness of their horses was put to the test by the troops on their broken-down animals.

On the subject of supplying the troops in New Mexico with *subsistence* I had the honor to report on the 14th instant. I would only further add, that it was remarked to me by Captain Bowman, regimental quartermaster of the third infantry, and acting assistant commissary of subsistence at El Paso, that much expense in transporting subsistence across the plains was incurred by packing *bacon, hard bread, &c.*; in barrels; the bacon sides being cut into square pieces (the bones were not removed) left large interstices in the barrels; and these again leave intervals in the wagon bodies, by which much space is lost. He recommended that square boxes of convenient size, and made to fit in the wagon bodies, be used instead of barrels; also that hard bread be baked in square cakes, and be packed in similar boxes. I examined the weight of some of the barrels (whiskey barrels) used for bread, and found they ranged from 45 to 56 pounds, while the hard bread contained did not exceed from 90 to 112 pounds. Boxes

would be lighter than these barrels, but it is questionable whether the bread would be as well preserved.

There is no reason, however, why all the hard bread required for use in New Mexico should not be made there, and for this purpose it would be well to send out one or two competent bakers.

“4. The probable number of inhabitants of New Mexico—Americans, Mexicans, and Pueblo Indians; also the number of each class within its limits whilst a territory of Mexico.”

I have answered this query in my report of the 15th July last as fully, I believe, as I could possibly now, by going over the same ground again.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. A. McCALL,
Inspector General.

Major General R. JONES,

Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington city, D. C.

